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Introduction
In September 1994, the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland and the Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking sponsored a conference on
liquidity, monetary policy, and financial inter-
mediation. This symposium was the fifth in a
jointly sponsored series aimed at promoting
research on basic issues in monetary policy,
financial markets, and the payments system. 
This particular conference dealt with mone-
tary policy issues. The papers included exami-
nations of the macroeconomic effects of price
rigidity and “sluggish” savings decisions by
households (that is, the assumption of limited
participation in financial markets), the interac-
tion of inflation and financial intermediation,
and the “deep structural’’ estimation of parame-
ters in models with money and financial inter-
mediation. The common thread in all of these
studies is the attempt to move us farther down
the road to understanding the fundamental
structures that ultimately determine the eco-
nomic consequences of monetary policy. A
complete list of the papers, their authors, and
the discussants is provided in box 1.
This summary of the proceedings groups the
papers (somewhat artificially) according to the
type of model presented. The first group exam-
ines the general equilibrium effects of sticky
prices, the second assumes that savings, rather
than prices, are sluggish, and the third repre-
sents models of deep structural intermediation.
I. Sticky Prices
In traditional static IS-LM models with sticky
prices, a monetary expansion leads to a fall in
both nominal interest rates (the so-called liquid-
ity effect) and real interest rates, which in turn
stimulates investment spending and hence out-
put. These types of models have come under
attack recently on both empirical and method-
ological grounds. The lessons of the 1970s
taught us that, contrary to the implications of
the simplest versions of these models, high
inflation concurrent with high unemployment is
possible. However, it is generally recognized
that such models were poorly specified and
that the dynamic general equilibrium implica-
tions of price inflexibility may be much differ-
ent—and empirically more plausible—than
those of earlier static sticky-price models. For
these reasons, there is a great deal of interest in3
examining price rigidities in dynamic general
equilibrium frameworks.
In this vein, the papers by Miles Kimball and
by Lee Ohanian, Alan Stockman, and Lutz Kilian
take as their starting point this familiar position:
Monetary policy has real effects because some
or all goods in the economy have sticky prices.
Both papers represent an attempt to construct
explicitly dynamic macroeconomic models 
with less-than-perfect price flexibility, incorpo-
rating elements typically associated with simple
Keynesian analysis into relatively standard real-
business-cycle frameworks.
In “The Effects of Real and Monetary Shocks
in a Business Cycle Model with Some Sticky
Prices,” Ohanian, Stockman, and Kilian (OSK)
adopt a simple specification for price stickiness
(dating back at least to Phelps and Taylor
[1977]) in which firms that exhibit price rigidity
preset their prices one period in advance. How-
ever, unlike the few other papers that are simi-
larly constructed, OSK allow for both a sticky-
and a flexible-price sector.1 Their novel finding
is that the cyclical behavior of aggregate vari-
ables is influenced only slightly by introducing
price rigidities, even when the sticky-price sec-
tor is relatively large and despite the important
distributional consequences associated with real
and monetary shocks.
This surprising conclusion—which does not
characterize one-sector sticky-price models—
appears to arise from the assumption that the
investment sector is not subject to price rigidi-
ties.  The key insight into understanding this
result is that modeling investment as a sticky-
price good induces both an intratemporal and
an intertemporal distortion, the latter of which
is not present when investment is the flexible-
price good.  If investment were placed in the
sticky-price sector, OSK’s results would pre-
sumably change dramatically.
In “The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic
Neomonetarist Model,” Miles Kimball maintains
the simpler one-sector setup of earlier papers.
However, unlike OSK, who assume that all
sticky prices are preset one period in advance,
his introduction of less-than-perfect price flexi-
bility is motivated by increasing returns to
scale and imperfect competition. Like Calvo’s
(1983) model, each firm gets the opportunity to
adjust its prices at intervals determined exoge-
nously by a Poisson process.2  One interesting
implication of this setup is that the aggregate
rate of price adjustment in general equilibrium
differs from the rate at which prices adjust for
individual firms. In fact, given Kimball’s pre-
ferred parameter values, the rate of macro-
economic price adjustment is four times that of
an individual firm. This surprising degree of
n 1 See, for example, Cooley and Hansen (1994), Cho and Cooley
(1990), and King (1990).
n 2 The Poisson distribution specifies that the probability of an op-
portunity to adjust prices is the same for all time intervals of equal length,
and that these probabilities are independent across any two periods.
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“The Effects of Real and Monetary Shocks in a Business
Cycle Model with Some Sticky Prices,” by Lee E.
Ohanian, Alan C. Stockman, and Lutz Kilian. Comment
by Christian Gilles and John V. Leahy.
“The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic Neomonetarist
Model,” by Miles S. Kimball. Comment by Michael
Woodford.
“Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy in a Gen-
eral Equilibrium Banking Model,” by Pamela Labadie.
Comment by Deborah J. Lucas and Stephen D.
Williamson.
“Monetary and Financial Interactions in the Business
Cycle,” by Timothy S. Fuerst. Comment by Charles L.
Evans and Mark Gertler.
“Inside Money,Outside Money,and Short-Term Interest
Rates,” by V.V. Chari, Lawrence J. Christiano, and Mar-
tin Eichenbaum. Comment by Wilbur John Coleman II
and Julio J. Rotemberg.
“Estimating Policy-Invariant Deep Parameters in the
Financial Sector When Risk and Growth Matter,” by
William A. Barnett, Milka Kirova, and Meenakshi Pasu-
pathy. Comment by Stephen G. Cecchetti and David A.
Marshall.
“Liquidity Effects and Transactions Technologies,” by
Michael Dotsey and Peter Ireland. Comment by Finn E.
Kydland, Donald E. Schlagenhauf, and Jeffrey Wrase.
“Computable General Equilibrium Models and Monetary
Policy Advice,” by David E. Altig, Charles T. Carlstrom,
and Kevin J. Lansing. Comment by Eric M. Leeper and
Edward C. Prescott.
SOURCE: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 27, no. 4, part 2
(November 1995).4
persistence is potentially important, given that
the persistence in most general equilibrium
business-cycle models is very weak. (We will
return to the issue of persistence below.)
The sticky prices at the heart of the OSK and
Kimball papers are, of course, central to the
typical textbook treatment of static Keynesian
IS-LM analysis. Interestingly, it is unclear
whether the liquidity effect survives the transla-
tion of price rigidity to dynamic general equilib-
rium contexts. In Kimball’s model, a monetary
injection stimulates investment spending, which,
in the absence of adjustment costs, will increase
the real interest rate.  Because such policies also
raise inflation expectations when money is posi-
tively serially correlated, the nominal interest
rate rises unambiguously. This conclusion can
be overturned by the introduction of adjustment
costs if prices in the economy adjust quickly
enough. However, unless the half-life for
macroeconomic price adjustments is less than
two quarters—which Kimball argues is unrealis-
tically brief—real interest rates will increase
with monetary injections, ruling out any hope
for generating liquidity effects.
In OSK, monetary injections do temporarily
lower the real rate of interest.3 However,
based on their chosen calibration, increases in
anticipated inflation dominate these real
effects, and the nominal rate rises following a
positive monetary shock.
In light of these results, it does not appear
straightforward to construct sticky-price models
that generate liquidity effects. The key difficulty
is that prices must adjust slowly to mitigate the
expected inflation component. However, we
know from Kimball’s paper that slower price
adjustment is precisely the condition that magni-
fies demand effects, thus increasing investment




The difficulty in generating a liquidity effect
with sticky-price models leads Kimball to con-
clude that “it may be necessary to model any
real-world tendency for the real (and hence the
nominal) interest rate to fall in response to a
monetary stimulus as a result of output being
temporarily off the IS curve.” In some sense, this
is essentially the strategy of the so-called limited-
participation framework pioneered by Lucas
(1990) and Fuerst (1992). The key insight of
these papers is embedded in the assumption
that agents must adjust their portfolios slowly.
Although investment equals saving ex post, limi-
tations on financial market transactions break the
household’s ex post intertemporal linkage, at
least temporarily. Such a break would appear to
be a necessary condition for any model to simul-
taneously generate a liquidity effect and a hump-
shaped response of consumption following a
decline in the federal funds rate, both of which
seem to characterize post–World War II data.5
In fact, a central motivation for the limited-
participation framework is to provide a model
in which monetary injections can generate both
a liquidity effect and a temporary expansion of
output. Four of the papers in this volume—
Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum; Altig, Carl-
strom, and Lansing; Dotsey and Ireland; and
Fuerst—can be considered studies that flesh
out the properties of models incorporating the
limited-participation device.
“Inside Money, Outside Money, and Short-
Term Interest Rates,” by V.V. Chari, Lawrence
Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum (CCE),
attempts to impose a theoretical structure on
key monetary business-cycle regularities identi-
fied in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1995).  Of
particular concern is what the authors refer to
as the “sign-switch” phenomenon: Nonbor-
rowed reserves co-vary negatively with the fed-
eral funds rate, while broader measures of
money co-vary positively.
An essential element of CCE’s model is a
careful disentangling of exogenous monetary
shocks from endogenous responses of both
the monetary authority and private intermedi-
aries. The key identifying assumptions with re-
spect to the monetary authority’s behavior are
that innovations in nonborrowed reserves are
associated with exogenous policy shocks, and
innovations in borrowed reserves are endoge-
nous policy reactions to output, or technology,
shocks. Because nonborrowed-reserve innova-
tions represent unanticipated policy changes,
n 3 Because the OSK model presets prices for one period, this result
is consistent with Kimball’s conclusion that real rates decline when prices
adjust relatively quickly.
n 4 Sticky wages do not resolve this quandary.  Wages that take suf-
ficiently long to adjust also lead to the prediction that the real interest rate
is positively related to monetary surprises. Ohanian and Stockman (1995)
provide an example of a two-sector model with price rigidity in which liq-
uidity effects arise. However, this variant of their model does not include
capital.  Again, it appears that the treatment of investment is critical in
sticky-price models.
n 5 See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1995).5
they interact with the limited-participation
assumption to generate liquidity effects.6
Broader aggregates, however, are dominated
by both the positive response of the discount
window and loan creation by financial inter-
mediaries, thus accounting for the sign switch
that the authors wish to capture.7
The model also broadly captures some of the
simple dynamics of relationships between the
federal funds rate and various monetary aggre-
gates found in U.S. data (see table 1).  Specifi-
cally, consistent with the data, the CCE model
generates a positive correlation between the
short-term interest rate and lagged values of the
model’s analogue to M1 and the monetary base,
as well as a negative correlation with future
values. In addition, the model exhibits the ob-
served symmetric negative correlation between
the interest rate and nonborrowed reserves.
However, the leading relationship of the funds
rate with the monetary variables is much
stronger in the data than in the model. The
authors attribute this to the offsetting influences
of real and monetary shocks, and suggest that
fully capturing these dynamics would require
either strengthening the dynamic effect of mon-
etary shocks or reducing that of real shocks.
Contrasted with CCE, the paper by David
Altig, Charles Carlstrom, and Kevin Lansing
(ACL) maintains the less-rich intermediary
structure of earlier limited-participation models.
In “Computable General Equilibrium Models
and Monetary Policy Advice,” ACL’s innovation
involves examining the model’s short-run fore-
casting performance—an approach for “taking
the model to the data” that has been largely
unexplored in the context of quantitative gen-
eral equilibrium analysis.8 In addition, the
setup in ACL incorporates a central-bank re-
action function that involves operating on a
nominal interest-rate target, as opposed to the
standard strategy of expressing the reaction
function in terms of a monetary aggregate. 
ACL’s goal is to investigate whether com-
putable general equilibrium models have
reached the stage where they can be directly
useful to policymakers. The specific question
posed is whether variations and extensions of
fairly standard quantitative-theoretic models can
provide accurate real-time forecasts of both in-
flation and real GDP growth. The results of this
exercise are mixed. ACL argue that quantitative-
theoretic models do appear to be capable of
delivering a reasonable degree of forecasting
accuracy: When mean-squared-error and mean-
absolute-deviation metrics are used, the model’s
forecast errors with respect to inflation and out-
put growth are comparable to those of the
internal Federal Reserve Board forecasts con-
structed for Federal Open Market Committee
briefings. However, to obtain inflation forecasts
that are at least as good as Board staff projec-
tions, ACL make an ad hoc, “judgmental” ad-
justment to their model.9
As in the CCE paper, the failures in ACL
provide some clues about the direction that
limited-participation models must take to de-
liver a fully satisfactory empirical performance.
For example, the problem with the nonjudg-
mental ACL model shows up clearly in its infla-
tion forecasts for 1993. Over the course of that
year, the federal funds rate and inflation both
TABLE  1
Correlation Properties of Money 
and Output, 1954:IQ–1988:IIQ
n 6 Some additional persistence is built into the model by assuming
that interperiod portfolio adjustment is costly, in contrast to the solely one-
period sluggishness built into the Fuerst (1992) model.
n 7 The identifying assumptions in CCE are somewhat stronger than
those imposed in either Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) or Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1995), in that these papers do not assume that
nonborrowed-reserve innovations are entirely exogenous to current tech-
nology shocks. This difference is likely to be important: The CCE model
counterfactually predicts a positive contemporaneous correlation between
nonborrowed reserves and output. As the authors point out, the observed
negative correlation could presumably be generated by incorporating a
reaction function in which the monetary authority “leans against the wind.”
Whether such a model would continue to exhibit the sign-switch property
is an open question. 
n 8 See, however, Rotemberg (1994), which measures model per-
formance in terms of the correlations among long-run forecastable move-
ments of prices, output, and the monetary aggregates.
n 9 The ACL model treats deviations of the federal funds rate as
exogenous inputs in simulating the path of inflation and output. Their
judgmental adjustment amounts to replacing the deviation of the nominal
federal funds rate from a constant mean (or the long-run value) with the
deviation from a “moving” mean, measured as a moving average of past
federal fund rates.
xt + 2 xt + 1 xt xt – 1 xt – 2
M1 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.18 0.10
Monetary base 0.37 0.39 0.34 0.26 0.20
Nonborrowed 
reserves 0.10 –0.06 –0.22 –0.32 –0.34
NOTE: Entries represent the correlation of xt with outputt – k. All variables
are logged and Hodrick–Prescott filtered.
SOURCE: V.V. Chari, Lawrence J. Christiano, and Martin Eichenbaum,
“Inside Money, Outside Money, and Short-Term Interest Rates” (see box 1).6
stabilized near 3 percent, implying inflation-
adjusted real rates near zero (see figure 1).
Given the calibration of the model, the ACL
framework delivers a long-run real interest rate
of 3 percent. In the absence of persistence in
real interest rates, or perhaps more extensive
monetary non-neutralities than those delivered
by a one-quarter limited-participation assump-
tion, the only way to support a sustained 3 per-
cent nominal funds rate is for monetary policy
to engineer an expected inflation of approxi-
mately zero. But such an outcome is clearly
inconsistent with the data, since it is unreason-
able to believe that agents would have ration-
ally expected zero inflation during that period.
ACL argue that the failure of their model is
actually a failure present in most general equi-
librium models; that is, most existing frame-
works do not deliver the type of persistence in
real variables that is found in the data.10 In
“Monetary and Financial Interactions in the
Business Cycle,” Timothy Fuerst examines this
issue by investigating whether adding more
extensive non-neutralities arising from financial
markets can generate more serial correlation in
real variables than does a standard model. In
particular, he looks at whether persistence can
be introduced by adding a financial structure
that gives rise to countercyclical endogenous
agency costs. 
The basic idea of the Fuerst framework is to
build in frictions similar to those discussed by
Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Entrepreneurs
live for one period and work to receive a wage
income. They then use this income, along with
additional funds borrowed from households, to
produce capital.  Individual entrepreneurs can
costlessly observe how much capital they pro-
duce, but other agents must expend a resource
cost to monitor the project’s outcome. This
agency problem leads to a standard debt con-
tract and reduces the amount of investment
(and thus capital accumulation) in equilibrium.
The idea is that a positive technology shock
today will increase an entrepreneur’s net worth
or wage income, which will mitigate agency
costs and boost capital accumulation. The
hope is that this extra capital will lead to
greater persistence.
Fuerst finds that the amount of persistence
generated by his experiments is nearly identical
to that of standard quantitative business-cycle
models. The reason is that his method of intro-
ducing agency costs leaves capital as the only
method of propagating shocks across time. The
failure is thus another illustration that capital
adds little to the serial correlation properties of
the standard quantitative business-cycle model.
Although Fuerst’s model does exhibit a small
propagation effect on net worth through the
capital channel, his setup is fundamentally
unable to generate persistent movements in net
worth because entrepreneurs are assumed to
live for only one period. However, allowing
entrepreneurs to live for many periods opens
up the possibility of a repeated game between
households and entrepreneurs as well as an
immense amount of potential heterogeneity,
implying that straightforward extensions of
Fuerst’s model are nontrivial.11
A skeptical view of the limited-participation
framework is provided by Michael Dotsey and
Peter Ireland.  In “Liquidity Effects and Transac-
tions Technologies,” they note the ad hoc one-
period adjustment cost formulation in both ACL
and Fuerst, and similarly criticize CCE’s use of 
a more general adjustment cost formulation
without proper calibration of the magnitude of
these costs. Like CCE’s model, Dotsey and 
Ireland’s considers a financial intermediation
structure that implies a spread between the
FIGURE  1
Federal Funds Rate and Inflation,
1982:IVQ–1994:IQ
a. Average daily rate on overnight fed funds as reported by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
b. Four-quarter percent change in the Consumer Price Index.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
n 10 This idea is not new. For example, Cogley and Nason (1995)
argue that persistence in most quantitative business cycle models is
completely inherited from the exogenous shock process, which is
assumed to be serially correlated. See Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher
(1995) for a recent attempt to build a framework that directly tackles this
issue in the context of resolving asset-pricing puzzles that arise in stan-
dard business cycle models.
n 11 See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996) for an extension of Fuerst’s
model that includes entrepreneurs who live for multiple periods.7
deposit rate paid to households and the loan
rate charged by intermediaries. Although less
rich in detail than the CCE model, the Dotsey/
Ireland framework expands the basic limited-
participation setup by introducing explicit rep-
resentations of the costs of adjusting both
household and intermediary portfolios. The
central question they address is whether the
liquidity effects generated by existing limited-
participation models survive the introduction of
plausible specifications for such costs. 12
The challenging aspect of this exercise is to
calibrate the relevant adjustment cost func-
tions.  Dotsey and Ireland do so by capitalizing
on the fact that their model delivers a wedge
between loan and deposit rates that is depend-
ent on the parameters of the representative
intermediary’s adjustment cost function.13 The
model is explicitly connected to the data by
associating loan rates with commercial paper
rates, and deposit rates with the return on
small time deposits.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to calibrate
directly to the spread itself, since generating the
observed average differential would require
introducing fixed marginal costs to loan pro-
duction, which are themselves unobservable.
The authors’ provocative solution is to calibrate
to the standard deviation of the difference
between commercial-paper and time-deposit
rates. This does not, however, pin down the
key parameter in the household’s cost function.
Dotsey and Ireland proceed by assuming that
household costs are a simple multiple of the
costs to a financial intermediary.
The bottom line of the Dotsey/Ireland
experiments is that the liquidity effects which
motivate the limited-participation framework
are not easily preserved when the assumption
of infinite transaction costs is relaxed. Given
their parameterization, they find that liquidity
effects of the magnitude reported by, say,
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), require
household transaction costs that are roughly
seven times as large as intermediaries’ costs.
This corresponds to about 123 minutes of for-




Dotsey and Ireland conclude that their results
militate for research efforts that return to “... the
more careful methodology of building financial
structure from microfoundations ....”  Such
efforts are represented in the papers by Pamela
Labadie and by William Barnett, Milka Kirova,
and Meenakshi Pasupathy. 
The Labadie study, “Financial Intermediation
and Monetary Policy in a General Equilibrium
Banking Model,” contains a detailed model
with many salient features of the U.S. financial
sector.  Banks, for example, are subject to
reserve requirements, hold assets that consist of
loans (to both the private and public sectors)
and equity capital, and have access to deposit
insurance. Furthermore, the model contains a
government sector that operates much like the
Federal Reserve in that it sets reserve require-
ments, supplies deposit insurance, and con-
ducts open-market operations that alter the
aggregate ratio of bonds to money. 
The Labadie framework incorporates several
features typically associated with monetary non-
neutrality. These include informational asym-
metries that make intermediation costly, and
household assets (deposits) with fixed nominal
returns. Despite these elements, Labadie reports
the surprising result that monetary policy ac-
tions which alter the size and composition of
nominal assets are entirely neutral.  Although
she finds that non-neutralities appear in cases
where monitoring costs are fixed in nominal
terms, it is unclear how such a device should 
be interpreted.
It is apparent that some other special fea-
tures of Labadie’s model contribute to this
result. Banks, for instance, write optimal state-
contingent loan contracts that are expressed in
real terms.  Also, household saving consists
solely of bank deposits and bank equity. Thus,
it appears that any redistribution of wealth
caused by the effects of unanticipated price
changes on real deposit returns are rechan-
neled to the affected agents via changes in the
market value of equity claims. Disentangling
this and the many other elements of her very
rich model could provide considerable insight
into how the regulatory environment and finan-
cial market structure interact and what the con-
sequences are for the macroeconomy.
n 12 The standard model in this class assumes (at least implicitly)
that intraperiod adjustment costs are infinite.
n 13 The model’s cost functions — which depend on the ratio of
deposits to money — are quadratic, so that the spread is proportional to
the function’s sole parameter. Although both the CCE and Dotsey/Ireland
models generate deposit-to-loan-rate spreads, they arise from very differ-
ent sources. The spread in CCE results from a combination of reserve
requirements and the contribution of excess reserves in the representative
intermediary’s production function.8
As in almost all of the papers presented at
the conference, the Labadie model takes the
measurement of money as a given. In studies
where models are taken to the actual data,
money is assumed to correspond to some stan-
dard monetary aggregate. An exception is the
article by Barnett, Kirova, and Pasupathy
(BKP), who explore a methodology to con-
struct money from the fundamental problems
solved by economic actors in a well-defined,
explicit economic environment.
In “Estimating Policy-Invariant Deep Parame-
ters in the Financial Sector When Risk and
Growth Matter,” BKP start from the perspective
of the well-known Lucas critique; that is, sensi-
ble experiments involving policy simulations
require knowledge of the functions describing
private decision rules that are invariant to the
class of policy interventions being considered.
However, the authors, appealing to insights
from Barnett’s earlier work, take the argument
one step further: Experiments involving policy
simulations also require knowledge of the
policy-invariant aggregator functions describing
the theoretical monetary aggregates. 14
The strategy in BKP is to jointly estimate the
deep parameters of preferences and technolo-
gies—including the parameters of the relevant
aggregator functions—from Euler-equation rep-
resentations of the optimization problems of
financial intermediaries, manufacturing firms,
and households. Upon obtaining these esti-
mates, the authors compare the implied theoret-
ical aggregates from the separate sectors with
the corresponding Divisia indexes and simple-
sum aggregates. They argue that the Divisia
indexes do a relatively good job of tracking
their theoretical money measures, and that
simple-sum aggregates—the class of which con-
tains all the typical monetary aggregates used in
the other papers—do substantially worse.
BKP’s critique of the standard approach to
measuring monetary assets is a serious chal-
lenge to anyone interested in the empirical
relationship between money and the macro-
economy. In describing their methodology,
BKP write:
The purpose of all scientific research is to
reveal the truth, not to alter the data in a man-
ner that may tend to justify some precon-
ceived policy view. The purpose of data is to
measure something that exists, i.e., an aggre-
gator function that is separable within the
structure of the economy.  (p. 1405) 
Contrast this view with the position taken by
Friedman and Schwartz (1970):
... the definition of money is to be sought for
not on the grounds of principle but on
grounds of usefulness in organizing our
knowledge of economic relationships.
“Money” is that to which we choose to assign
a number by specified operations; it is not
something in existence to be discovered, like
the American continent ....  (p. 137)  
Determining which of these views is correct
has fundamental implications for the organiza-
tion and development of monetary facts and,
ultimately, for the conduct of monetary policy.    
IV. Summary
Each paper presented at the conference inves-
tigates at least one piece of the puzzle that
must be solved if policymakers are to use
dynamic general equilibrium models for giving
policy advice. OSK and Kimball both provide a
cautionary note by showing that the implica-
tions of sticky prices may not be as apparent
as many economists think. For instance, it is
inherently very difficult for this assumption to
deliver a liquidity effect—something that most
policymakers take for granted. Although the
limited-participation (or sluggish-portfolio)
assumption was invented to specifically gener-
ate inverse movements in money shocks and
nominal interest rates, Dotsey and Ireland
question whether portfolio costs, when prop-
erly calibrated, are large enough to deliver the
desired effect.
Similarly, when a fairly standard computable
general equilibrium model is actually taken to
the data and used for forecasting purposes,
ACL conclude that existing models need either
more extensive monetary non-neutralities or
some other added friction in order to generate
the persistence in real variables that character-
izes the data. Yet the message of Labadie’s
paper is that adding frictions is not always suf-
ficient to generate monetary non-neutralities,
let alone ones that have lasting effects on the
real economy.
These unanswered questions clearly leave
researchers with much work to do before
dynamic general equilibrium models supplant
static IS-LM models for policymakers, as they
have for most academic economists.
n 14 See Barnett (1987), Barnett, Fisher, and Serletis (1992),
and Barnett and Hahm (1994).
NOTE:To order a copy of these conference 
proceedings, see page 32.9
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